**Transferable namespace projection in bind9**

Assume that you have control over a zone `somezone.net`,
i.e. you can add records in that zone. With
this patch
to bind-9.1.3 you can designate a new domain, even a
TLD, e.g. `.mytld`. Every hostname `h.mytld` in that zone
is CNAMEd to a hostname `j` in `somezone.net`, where
`j = SHA1(h . <secret>)`. `<secret>` is
set in bind's config file. This allows you to assign
arbitrary meaningful names in `.mytld`, like
`icannsucks.mytld`. The DNS queries that leave the subnet
with your modified bind refer to meaningless hostnames in
`somezone.net`. If you want to share this local namespace
with someone, you just have to send him/her the configfile entry
that defines the TLD and the secret.

*[/projects]
permanent link*

**Factoring silly keys from the keyservers**

At the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop in 2004, Ben Laurie and
I did the following experiment: Take all RSA moduli from PGP keys presumably
created with old versions of PGP and compute the pairwise gcds
(Peter Palfrader supplied us with the keys). It turns out
that two keys of about 18.000 have a common divisor in their moduli:
pub 512R/A6A0B399 1994-08-22
uid Joe Schmuckley

and
pub 1024R/575F0491 1995-04-25
uid Ptolemy\x94XIV

I attacked the second key with Paul Zimmermann's Elliptic Curve Factoring implementation.

The key's modulus is

1549562663450840692268622483721103711669388864897522390528764

829445645828909290189247132280621825493873705019175480670501

2516682556124827129012380911158436701354213114871849305291083

202711859451406305095386470946490932290315424308032810615741

2235640682459755462203449571275078025946614196463838287264848

217233

This is **not** the product of two primes. So far we found the
following factors:
- 3 (Yes, three!)
- 3 (Yes, it's not even squarefree)
- 42742556573248957
- 314267779982277702367112491702024117309

The remainder is not prime but seems to contain no factors smaller
than 150 bits.

*[/projects]
permanent link*